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Abstract
Evidence of risk aversion in laboratory settings over small stakes leads to a priori implausible levels
of risk aversion over large stakes under certain assumptions. One core assumption in statements of
this calibration puzzle is that small-stakes risk aversion is observed over all levels of wealth, or over a
“sufficiently large” range of wealth. Although this assumption is viewed as self-evident from the vast
experimental literature showing risk aversion over laboratory stakes, it actually requires that lab
wealth be varied for a given subject as one evaluates the risk attitudes of the subject. We consider
evidence from a simple design that tests this assumption, and find that the assumption is strikingly
rejected for a large sample of subjects from a population of college students. We conclude that the
implausible predictions that flow from these assumptions do not apply to one specialized population
widely used to study economic behavior in laboratory experiments. 
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Debate surrounding theories of decisions under risk and uncertainty has renewed interest in the
arguments of the utility function over event outcomes. The local measure of risk aversion  proposed by
Arrow [1971] and Pratt [1964] for expected utility theory (EUT) is based on terminal wealth being the
argument. However, there is nothing in the axiomatic foundation of EUT that requires one to use
terminal wealth as the argument: Vickrey [1945] used income instead of terminal wealth; von Neumann
and Morgenstern [1953; p. 15-31] were  agnostic; and Luce and Raiffa [1957; ch.2] discussed
alternatives such as scalar amounts of terminal wealth or income or, alternatively, vectors of
commodities. Arrow [1964], Debreu [1959; ch.7] and Hirshleifer [1966] developed models in which the
arguments of utility functions are vectors of contingent commodities.
The choice of arguments of the utility function can have important consequences for the
inferences one can plausibly draw from empirical estimates of risk attitudes. Many economics
experiments present participants with gambles over relatively small stakes and find that such gambles
are frequently turned down in favor of less risky gambles with smaller expected values. If the argument
of the utility function is terminal wealth, then some patterns of small stakes risk aversion have
implausible implications for preferences over gambles where the stakes are no longer small. One
example from Rabin [2000] is that the expected utility of terminal wealth model implies that an agent
who turns down a 50/50 bet of losing $100 or gaining $110, at all initial wealth levels between $100
and $300,000, will also, at initial wealth of $290,000, turn down a 50/50 bet with possible loss of $2,000
even when the gain is as large as $12 million. Although primarily used as an argument against EUT, it is
now well-known that this logic applies to a much wider range of models that assume the argument of
the utility function to be terminal wealth (Cox and Sadiraj [2006] and Safra and Segal [2008]). Hence the
methodological implications run much deeper than whether EUT is a useful descriptive model of
behavior.
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Given the importance of understanding the arguments of the utility function, the absence of
empirical tests is remarkable. We focus squarely on the specific and influential claim that evidence of
small stakes risk aversion in the laboratory generate implausible risk aversion implications for any
model in which terminal wealth is the argument of the utility function.1 We refer to this claim as the
HRC, following Hansson [1988] and Rabin [2000]. We build on a simple theoretical test and
experimental design originally developed by Cox and Sadiraj [2008], and independently later by Wilcox
[2013]; our design follows theirs. Although this design has wider implications, we focus on implications
for calibration puzzles defined over terminal wealth models, which are the models that initiated the
modern debate.
We present direct evidence that the empirical premiss underlying the HRC claim is false for the typical
subjects of laboratory experiments: students in a first-world university.2 These subjects exhibit risk aversion
for small stakes lotteries for the initial terminal wealth that they bring to the lab, but as we increase the
terminal wealth of the subjects they exhibit risk neutrality. We make no claim that this finding
generalizes to other populations, fully expect that it could vary from population to population, and
encourage tests with different populations.3
We review the theoretical statement of the usual calibration puzzle in section 1, using the
simple example from Hansson [1988] since it is not widely known and illustrates the basic points.  The
generalization by Rabin [2000] can then be quickly stated. Our experimental design is presented in
1 Neilson [2001] and Safra and Segal [2008] also provide concavity calibration claims for terminal
wealth models.
2 There have been comparable tests of the premisses of the calibration claims by Cox, Sadiraj, Vogt
and Dasgupta [2013]. One of their experiments involved subjects in Calcutta, India; another involved a casino
in Europe and some experimental procedures that are non-standard (in effect, the lab wealth was extremely
risky wealth, and plausibly hypothetical wealth from the ex ante perspective of the subject). Wilcox [2013]
independently derived similar tests in the laboratory.
3 We now incorporate these simple lottery choices in most batteries we use in the lab and the field for
new populations.
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section 2, and follows Cox and Sadiraj [2008]. We evaluate the resulting empirical evidence from 28
binary choices by 590 student subjects in section 3.
1. Theory
What if an individual always rejects a 50:50 lottery offering x and x+$3 in favor of x+$1 for
certain? Without loss of essential generality, assume indifference, so that u(x+1) = ½ u(x) + ½ u(x+3).
One solution to this equation is the utility function u(x) = 1-ax for a . 0.618. It is useful in the sequel to
note that this is a bounded function, since u(x) 6 1 as x 6 4. Now consider increments in utility from x:
u(x+1) - u(x) . 0.382 ax (1)
u(x+4) - u(x) = 1 - (1-ax) = ax (2)
If (1) and (2) are true, then we can construct “trick lotteries” that make this decision maker look silly.
For instance, the decision maker must prefer a certain gain of 1 to a 0 < p < 0.382 chance of an
arbitrarily large gain X o x. For instance, p = ¼, since ¼ ax < 0.382 ax, and X = $1 million.
More general conditions for this implausible prediction are now established. If the utility
function is bounded on (0, 4) then that is a sufficient condition for implausible risk aversion in large
stakes (e.g., Cox and Sadiraj [2008; Proposition 2, p.20]). Indeed, the only empirical example offered by
Rabin [2000] uses a bounded CARA function. On the other hand, small-stakes risk aversion over a large
enough finite interval is a sufficient condition for implausible risk aversion for large stakes, whether or not
the utility function is bounded or unbounded.
The Hansson-Rabin calibration (HRC) puzzle may be stated in terms of four propositions:
• P Ö “the agent is a risk averse EUT maximizer”
• Q Ö “EUT implies full asset integration”
• R Ö “the agent turns down small-stakes gambles in favor of a certain amount with a slightly
lower expected value, and does so over a large enough4 range of wealth levels W”
4 The expression “large enough” is deliberately vague, since it depends on the degree of risk aversion
exhibited under proposition P, and the lotteries in proposition S that a priori seem to generate silly behavior.
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• S Ö “the agent turns down large-stakes gambles in favor of a certain amount with a significantly
lower value, and looks silly.”
The calibration puzzle is the claim that if P, Q and R are true, then S follows. Since the behavior
implied by proposition S is a priori implausible from a thought experiment, there must be some
inconsistency among these propositions. Rabin [2000] draws the implication that P must then be false,
and that one should employ models of decision-making under risk that relax proposition Q, such as
Cumulative Prospect Theory. As a purely logical matter, of course, this is just one way to resolve this
calibration puzzle.
2. Experimental Design
All of the evidence claimed to support the premiss that decision makers in experiments exhibit
small stakes risk aversion for a large enough finite interval comes from designs in which subjects come
to the lab with varying levels of wealth and are faced with small-stakes lotteries. This is actually indirect
evidence, even if it might be suggestive, since we do not know that different decision-makers have
varying levels of wealth, and there is nothing in EUT that would lead one to assume that they have the
same utility function. What is needed is an experimental design that varies the wealth of a given
decision-maker, who can be presumed to behave consistently with one utility function during the lab
session.5
Cox and Sadiraj [2008; p.33] propose an elegant design to test this claim correctly. Give the
agent a choice between a safe lottery of w for sure, and a risky lottery of a 50:50 chance of w-x or w+y,
where w-x $ 0 and y > x > 0. The key idea is to vary w in the lab.6 Consider values of w that can be
5 Thought experiments along these lines were developed by Watt [2002] and Palacios-Huerta and
Serrano [2006], and showed that the implied risk aversion underlying proposition R are a priori implausible.
Despite minor errors in some of the calculations of the latter, noted at
http://www.econ.brown.edu/Faculty/serrano/disclaimers/2006EL91dis.html, the message does not change. 
6 Cox and Sadiraj [2008; p.32] explain why one cannot test proposition R by only asking one lottery
choice question of this kind at only one level of lab wealth, as in Barberis, Huang and Thaler [2006; p. 1071]
and Schechter [2007]. In response to Watt [2002], Rabin and Thaler [2002; p.230] make exactly this mistake in
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denoted w, w, w, w, w, w, w, where smaller values of the letter w denote smaller values of lab wealth.
Consider values like these for lab wealth that may be plausibly much less than the W that the subject
has in the field prior to the experiment. The experimenter does not need to know W for a given
subject, but by varying “lab wealth” for that subject the experimenter has considered small-stakes
lottery choices over a loss of x and a gain of y for “field + lab” wealth levels W+w, W+w, W+w, W+w,
W+w, W+w and W+w, respectively, for that subject. This step of the design presumes that we vary
lab wealth for a given subject, since then we can presume that field wealth W is constant for the
experimental session.7 This step of the experimental design also assumes proposition Q, that the agent
perfectly asset integrates field wealth and lab wealth.
If the agent prefers the safe lottery over the risky lottery for all of the lab wealth values the
experimenter’s budget can afford, then we have verification of proposition R, at least for the range of
“field + lab” wealth proscribed by the experimenter’s budget. If we observe the agent choosing the safe
lottery for small levels of lab wealth but the risky lottery for larger levels of lab wealth, then proposition
R is rejected for that agent. Of course, we do not expect deterministic patterns of choice, so one ought
to make some claim about the statistical significance of these choice patterns. This is why we have 28
choices for each subject. Another nice feature of this experimental design is that we need not
structurally model the EUT decision process for the agent: we can rely on simple statistical models such
as (panel) probit, conditioned on lab wealth.
misunderstanding the existing experimental literature: “We refer any reader who believes in risk neutrality to
pick up virtually any experimental test of risk attitudes. Dozens of laboratory experiments show that people
are averse to far more favorable bets for smaller stakes. The idea that people are not risk neutral in playing for
modest stakes is uncontroversial; indeed, nobody to our knowledge interprets the existing evidence as arguing
that expected-value maximization (risk neutrality) is a good fit.” The tests proposed here address the
hypothesis of expected-value maximization for the relevant theoretical proposition R.
7 In other words, one cannot implement this aspect of the design on a between-subjects basis, or the
theoretical premiss could be violated by heterogeneity.
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Table 1 shows the 28 lottery pairs we used. The smallest lab wealth was $15 and the largest lab
wealth was $135. Table 1 shows that 20 of the choices involve 50:50 risky lotteries, and 8 of the choices
involve 90:10 risky lotteries to allow relatively high outcomes for the risky lottery. The order of lotteries
in Table 1 is solely for pedagogic convenience: the order of presentation was randomized
independently for each subject. One lottery is the safe lottery, and the other lottery is the risky lottery.
The far right columns of Table 1 show the Expected Value (EV) of each choice, and the difference in
favor of the risky lottery. Since the risky lottery provided an EV that always slightly exceeded the EV of
the safe lottery, we know that a choice of the safe lottery implies risk aversion under EUT. Since the
EV difference is strictly positive, choices of the risky lottery are consistent with risk neutrality or risk
preference under EUT.
The first 14 lottery choices reflect lower levels of lab wealth between $15 and $30, and the last
14 lottery choices, shaded in Table 1, reflect higher levels of lab wealth between $120 and $135. There
are repetitions of the -x and +y values at different levels of lab wealth: hence the design builds in
controls for the same losses and gains relative to lab wealth, and only varies lab wealth. For instance,
choice pairs 2 and 26 have x = 8 and y = 10, with lab wealth of $15 and $135, respectively. So apart
from the change in lab wealth, these are the same risky lotteries, as required by proposition R. Similarly,
choice pairs 9 and 18 have x = 18 and y = 21 with lab wealth of $25 and $125, respectively. There is
variation in the values of x and y, and the difference between x and y: the smallest difference between x
and y is $1 (e.g., choice pairs 3, 6, 7) and the largest difference is $85 (choice pairs 1, 12, 22 and 27).
3. Evidence
The battery in Table 1 was administered, in random order, to 590 undergraduates recruited
from the Georgia State University population. This battery was administered as part of a larger
experiment, in which subjects made a total of 100 binary choices, spanning gain, loss and mixed frames.
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A typical display is shown in Figure 1.8 Indifference was not permitted as an option. Subjects also
completed a demographics survey, and subsequently participated in a “lab casino” in which choices
mimicked those found in video slot machines. Each subject received a $5 show-up payment. One
feature of this experiment is that participation times in a given session were staggered, so that several
subjects joined the session at 30-minute intervals. All instructions were then administered in written
form, and with a video presentation on each computer that the subject listened to privately with
headphones. This procedure was used to avoid subjects feeling any peer pressure to finish early or late.
At the end of the 100 lottery choices, one choice was selected at random with physical dice, and then
the lottery chosen was played out with physical dice.9 Subjects were paid privately. The instructions are
reproduced in an appendix (available on request). 
 Figure 2 displays the basic results, using a simple (random effects, panel) probit specification in
which the binary choice is the dependent variable and the explanatory variable is lab wealth. For the
probit specifications we use quadratic and cubic terms to capture possible non-linearity in the estimated
latent index. Standard errors allow for clustering by subject. The solid line shows the average
prediction, and the shaded area shows the 95% confidence interval around that prediction. The results
are clear: subjects exhibit some risk aversion at low levels of lab wealth and exhibit risk neutrality (or
risk preference) at higher levels of lab wealth. Although relying on interpolation, the switch point
8 These lottery choices were embedded in a larger battery that included some choices in which there
were losses out of house endowments displayed for those choices. When there were no losses, the display did
not mention any house endowment, as in Figure 1.
9 We opted for using the Random Lottery Incentive Method (RLIM), where one of the 100 choices
was chosen at random for playing out and payment. We did so for two reasons, recognizing that this is not as
innocent a procedure as some maintain (see Harrison and Swarthout [2014], Cox, Sadiraj and Schmidt [2015]
and Brown and Healy [2016] for evidence and extensive literature discussion). The first reason was to ensure
that we collected choices over a wide enough array of lotteries to be able to test the premiss using within-
subject data. If we had opted for giving one choice to each subject, to avoid using the RLIM, this would have
been infeasible and would have required an extreme assumption of preference homogeneity across subjects.
The second reason was that the null hypothesis being tested is normally stated assuming EUT, and RLIM is
valid under EUT.
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appears to be around a lab wealth of $60. By this evidence we infer that proposition R is false for this
population and these lottery choices.10
Table 2 lists estimates of the probability of safe choices using several alternative statistical
specifications. One specification is a standard probit model, and another specification is a random
effects probit model; both use quadratic and cubic terms in lab wealth. A third specification is the
semi-nonparametric (SNP) approach of Gallant and Nychka [1987]. Although less parametric than the
probit specifications, the SNP estimates do not account for the panel nature of these data. Our
preferred specification is the random effects, panel probit, shaded in Table 2. The same qualitative
conclusion applies for all three specifications. The random effects probit implies more extreme
predictions above and below ½ than the other two specification, but in all cases the 95% confidence
intervals lie above ½ for small levels of lab wealth, and lie below ½ for higher levels of lab wealth.
4. Conclusions
For a sample from a population that is similar to populations that are widely used to study
behavior in experiments, the empirical basis for the calibration puzzle does not exist.
10 The qualitative results are even stronger if one drops the “skewed” risky lotteries, which are those
numbered 1, 5, 11, 12, 17, 21, 22 and 27 in Table 1.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
All currency values in U.S. Dollars
Lab Risky Lottery Expected Value
ID # Wealth Prob low Payoff low Prob hi Payoff hi -x y Safe Risky Difference
1 15 0.9 5 0.1 110 -10 95 15 15.5 0.5
2 15 0.5 7 0.5 25 -8 10 15 16 1
3 15 0.5 7 0.5 24 -8 9 15 15.5 0.5
4 20 0.5 10 0.5 32 -10 12 20 21 1
5 20 0.9 15 0.1 70 -5 50 20 20.5 0.5
6 20 0.5 10 0.5 31 -10 11 20 20.5 0.5
7 20 0.5 2 0.5 39 -18 19 20 20.5 0.5
8 25 0.5 12 0.5 40 -13 15 25 26 1
9 25 0.5 7 0.5 46 -18 21 25 26.5 1.5
10 25 0.5 10 0.5 43 -15 18 25 26.5 1.5
11 30 0.9 25 0.1 90 -5 60 30 31.5 1.5
12 30 0.9 20 0.1 125 -10 95 30 30.5 0.5
13 30 0.5 18 0.5 45 -12 15 30 31.5 1.5
14 30 0.5 15 0.5 46 -15 16 30 30.5 0.5
15 120 0.5 108 0.5 135 -12 15 120 121.5 1.5
16 120 0.5 110 0.5 132 -10 12 120 121 1
17 120 0.9 115 0.1 180 -5 60 120 121.5 1.5
18 125 0.5 107 0.5 146 -18 21 125 126.5 1.5
19 125 0.5 110 0.5 143 -15 18 125 126.5 1.5
20 125 0.5 112 0.5 140 -13 15 125 126 1
21 130 0.9 125 0.1 180 -5 50 130 130.5 0.5
22 130 0.9 120 0.1 225 -10 95 130 130.5 0.5
23 130 0.5 112 0.5 149 -18 19 130 130.5 0.5
24 130 0.5 120 0.5 141 -10 11 130 130.5 0.5
25 130 0.5 115 0.5 146 -15 16 130 130.5 0.5
26 135 0.5 127 0.5 145 -8 10 135 136 1
27 135 0.9 125 0.1 230 -10 95 135 135.5 0.5
28 135 0.5 127 0.5 144 -8 9 135 135.5 0.5
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Figure 1: Binary Choice Display
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Table 2: Predicted Safe Choices from Alternative Statistical Models
Lab Probit Random Effects Probit Semi-Non-Parametric (SNP)
Wealth Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI Mean 95% CI
$15 0.64 0.62 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.71 0.64 0.62 0.66
$20 0.61 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.66 0.61 0.60 0.62
$25 0.58 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.57 0.62 0.58 0.57 0.59
$30 0.55 0.53 0.57 0.56 0.53 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.56
$120 0.40 0.37 0.43 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.40 0.38 0.42
$125 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.40
$130 0.38 0.35 0.40 0.35 0.32 0.37 0.38 0.36 0.39
$135 0.36 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.34 0.38
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Appendix A: Instructions (NOT FOR PUBLICATION)
Choices Over Risky Prospects
This is a task where you will choose between prospects with varying prizes and chances of winning each
prize. You will be presented with a series of pairs of prospects where you will choose one of them. There are 100
pairs in the series. For each pair of prospects, you should choose the prospect you prefer. You will actually get
the chance to play one of these prospects, and you will be paid according to the outcome of that prospect, so
you should think carefully about which prospect you prefer.
Here is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of prospects will look like.
The outcome of the prospects will be determined by the draw of a random number between 1 and 100.
Each number between, and including, 1 and 100 is equally likely to occur. In fact, you will be able to draw the
number yourself using two 10-sided dice.
You will be told your cash endowment for each lottery at the top of the lottery. In this example it is $35,
so any earnings would be added to or subtracted from this endowment. The endowment may change from
choice to choice, so be sure to pay attention to it. The endowment you are shown only applies for that choice.
In this example the left prospect pays twenty-five dollars ($25) if the number drawn is between 1 and 5,
and pays negative five dollars ($-5) if the number is between 6 and 55, and pays negative thirty-five dollars ($-35)
if the number is between 56 and 100. The blue color in the pie chart corresponds to 5% of the area and
illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 1 and 5 and your prize will be $25. The orange area
in the pie chart corresponds to 50% of the area and illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be
between 6 and 55 and your prize will be $-5. The green area in the pie chart corresponds to 45% of the area and
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illustrates the chances that the number drawn will be between 56 and 100. When you select the lottery to be
played out the computer will confirm what die rolls correspond to the different prizes.
Now look at the pie on the right. It pays twenty-five dollars ($25) if the number drawn is between 1 and
15, negative five dollars ($-5) if the number is between 16 and 25, and negative thirty-five dollars ($-35) if the
number is between 26 and 100. As with the prospect on the left, the pie slices represent the fraction of the
possible numbers which yield each payoff. For example, the size of the $25 pie slice is 15% of the total pie.
Even though the screen says that you might win a negative amount, this is actually a loss to be deducted
from your endowment. So if you win $-5, your earnings would be $30 = $35 - $5.
Each pair of prospects is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen, you should
indicate which prospect you prefer to play by clicking on one of the buttons beneath the prospects. 
After you have worked through all of the pairs of prospects, raise your hand and an experimenter will
come over. You will then roll two 10-sided dice to determine which pair of the 100 prospects you chose will be
played out. Since there is a chance that any of your 100 choices could be played out for real, you should approach
each pair of prospects as if it is the one that you will play out. Finally, you will roll the two ten-sided dice again to
determine the outcome of the prospect you chose.
For instance, suppose you picked the prospect on the right in this example, and it was the pair chosen to
be played. If the random number from your rolls of the dice was 7, you would win $25 in addition to your
endowment; if it was 93, you would lose $35 from your endowment. If you picked the prospect on the left and
drew the number 7, you would lose $5 from your endowment; if it was 93, you would again lose $35 from your
endowment.
Therefore, your payoff is determined by three things:
• which prospect you selected, the left or the right, for each of these 100 pairs;
• which prospect pair is chosen to be played out in the series of 100 such pairs using the two 10-sided
dice; and
• the outcome of that prospect when you roll the two 10-sided dice again.
Which prospects you prefer is a matter of personal choice. The people next to you may be presented
with different prospects, and may have different preferences, so their responses should not matter to you or
influence your decisions. Please work silently, and make your choices by thinking carefully about each prospect.
All payoffs are in cash, and are in addition to the $5 show-up fee that you receive just for being here, as
well as any other earnings in other tasks from the session today.
-16-
